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A. Introduction
Tensions between political and legal accountability are a backdrop to many debates about the character and future direction of the British constitution.
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Th is essay explores a juncture of these two modes of accountability by examining how the UK Parliament exercises accountability in relation to the judicial system of England and Wales.
Part A defi nes 'the judicial system' and what may be meant by parliamentary accountability and judicial independence in this context. Part B takes an institutional and procedural approach to examining the opportunities Parliament has for engaging in accountability activities in relation to the judicial system, focusing in particular on the evolving role of Select Committees. Part C uses an inductive approach to map current accountability practices in Parliament in relation to particular aspects of the judicial system by drawing on examples from the parliamentary record to develop an explanation of what is and ought to be the reach of MPs' and peers' accountability functions relating to judges and courts.
Th e judicial system
Th e term 'judicial system' is used in this study to defi ne an area of state activity that is narrower than the whole legal system (so, for example, legal aid and the legal professions are left out) but broader than 'the judiciary' or 'the judicial power of the state'. Deciding cases and, for the higher courts, judgment writing to create precedents are the core activities of the judicial system. Closely connected to these are the practices and procedures of courts. Around this core is a penumbra of other activities and features that support and facilitate the judicial role. Th is includes the foundational texts (legislation and 'soft law') creating new courts and shaping the governance of the judiciary ; decision-making about judicial careers (appointments, terms and conditions of service, salaries and pensions, discipline and dismissals); deployment; training; and the management of the physical estate and infrastructures of the courts and tribunals.
Viewed as a set of institutions and decision-making processes, the judicial system comprises judges, ministers (in particular the Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State for Justice), offi cials, and holders of public offi ce (such as the commissioners of the Judicial Appointments Commission for England and Wales)-all of them potential targets of accountability according to their responsibilities.
Parliamentary accountability
Parliamentary accountability centres on formal questioning, comment, and critical evaluation of past decisions or changes to existing or proposed practices or policy by MPs and peers, as reported in Hansard and other parliamentary publications. Th e occasional criticism of judges by ministers and other parliamentarians in interviews, conference speeches, 2 and extra-parliamentary writing 3 are important in setting the tone of relations with the judiciary but they fall outside the scope of this essay, as they are not part of the formal parliamentary record.
Th e constitutional imperative for some kind of accountability in relation to some aspects of the judicial system cannot now be seriously doubted. 4 As a relevant principle, parliamentarians have accepted it, 5 as have the judiciary of England and Wales, 6 and ministers. 7 Th is refl ects the general importance now attached to clear lines of accountability across all public services; the legitimacy of most kinds of public power now depends on satisfactory accountability mechanisms. Th e challenge that remains is to defi ne more closely the circumstances in which parliamentarians may legitimately operate in relation to the judicial system, which accountability tools are best for the job, and what aspects of the judicial system should remain off -limits, or subject only to light-touch accountability oversight, by reason of the need to respect the constitutional principles of independence of the judiciary and separation of powers. Th is essay is a contribution to that debate.
a. Th e orthodox approach
Th e conventional account of the limits of parliamentary accountability for the judicial system rests on two main ideas. Th e fi rst is that the constitutional principle of judicial independence prohibits parliamentary scrutiny of the core aspect of the judicial system (deciding cases and setting precedents). In 2004 Chris Leslie MP, a junior minister, explained the point as follows :
Judicial decisions are taken and explained in public (save where the circumstances of a case demand confi dentiality) and any decision which a judge makes is liable to be scrutinised, and if necessary overturned, on appeal, which is also a public process. Judges are therefore fully accountable for their judicial decisions through the appeal system. Judges are not, however, accountable through a political process for the decisions they take, as this would not be consistent with judicial independence. Th e Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State therefore does not monitor appeals against decisions made by individual judges, and it is not his role to intervene in judicial decisions or consider complaints about judicial decisions. 8 Th e constitutional principle of judicial independence is a multifaceted concept. 9 It relates to individual judges (who should not be placed under such personal pressure through inquiries or criticism by politicians as to infl uence or risk infl uencing their decision making) and to the judiciary as a whole (which as an institution of the state should enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis government and parliament). Orthodox thinking priorities judicial independence over accountability: the latter must yield to the former in day-to-day practices and in constitutional design. It will be argued later that the broad cordon sanitaire around the judicial system that is often called for in the name of orthodox approaches to judicial independence is out of step with actual developments in the UK Parliament. Parliamentarians believe they can, and they do, question aspects of the judicial system more than orthodox thinking suggests is proper.
Th e other main idea in the orthodox approach is the assumption that accountability practices associated with ministerial responsibility are adequate to scrutinize other aspects of the judicial system beyond the prohibited zone. In other words, ministers are and should be answerable through parliamentary questions, in debates, in Select Committee inquiries ; and this delivers a satisfactory level of accountability. 
b. Recent innovations
Th is approach to accountability of the judicial system (that is, a prohibited zone plus ministerial accountability for the penumbra) is no longer satisfactory. First, remarkable changes to the scope of the 'judicial power of the state' 11 have taken place, through the development of common law powers of judicial review, the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998, and of European Union law. Judicial decision-making now impacts on government policy-making and parliamentary legislation in ways unthinkable two generations ago. It is unrealistic, against the background of these developments, to imagine that Parliament and parliamentarians will or should want to maintain a cordon sanitaire around judicial decision-making. Insofar as court decisions impact on the national interest and the lives of constituents, parliamentarians will want to debate and criticise them.
Second, since 2005 there have been equally remarkable changes to the governance arrangements for the judicial system. Th e radical reforms to the offi ce of Lord Chancellor mean that traditional notions of ministerial responsibility are no longer adequate to secure accountability for leadership roles, budgets, and decision-making powers that have been transferred or shared beyond the government department responsible for the judicial system-which was the Lord Chancellor's Department ('LCD') up to 2003, the relatively short-lived Department for Constitutional Aff airs 2003-7 (nicknamed 'DeCaf ' by some wags but more respectfully 'the DCA') and the Ministry of Justice ('MoJ') since May 2007.
Th e Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State provides political leadership in the Ministry of Justice, with four junior ministers. Th e Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State are two distinct ministerial offi ces to which the Prime Minister appoints the same person. Legislation dealing with judiciary-related matters normally specifi es the Lord Chancellor to be the responsible minister, though on occasion there has been debate as to which is the appropriate minister.
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Th e distinction is of constitutional importance as the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 places broad duties on the Lord Chancellor to 'have regard' to 'the need to defend' the independence of the judiciary and 'the need for the public interest in regard to matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice to be properly 10 Other ministers have the lesser duty to 'uphold the continued independence of the judiciary'.
14 Th e Ministry is a major department of state (no longer the sleepy backwater that the LCD once was), with an annual budget of £8.58 billion in 2011-12, of which £1.21 billion is allocated to HM Courts and Tribunals Service. Th e Ministry employed over 78,000 FTE staff in 2009-10.
In the new governance arrangements, several important functions are now carried out by public bodies that have an arm's length relationship to the Ministry, some with executive powers, some dispute resolution and inspection roles, and some advisory. Th is judicial comitology is set out in Appendix 1 below. Several have been or shortly will be abolished under the Public Bodies Act 2011 as part of government policy to reduce the number and cost of quangos.
Other roles have been transferred directly to the judiciary, under the ultimate leadership of the LCJ; a network of boards and committees carry out executive decisions and advisory work (see Appendix 2). Th e Judicial Offi ce consists of approximately 190 FTE civil servants who report directly to the Lord Chief Justice rather than to ministers.
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It has fi ve groups of staff : strategy, communications, and governance; human resources; senior judicial support through private offi ces and jurisdictional teams; the Judicial College; and corporate services. Th ere are plans to transfer decision-making power to accept, reject, or ask for reconsideration of selections by the Judicial Appointments Commission for some judicial posts from the Lord Chancellor (in the Ministry of Justice) to the Lord Chief Justice (in eff ect, to the Judicial Offi ce); presumably a transfer of staff from the Ministry of Justice will accompany this.
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Th e Judicial Executive Board (JEB), 'which appears to be envisaged as a sort of judicial Cabinet', 17 is chaired by the Lord Chief Justice and comprises nine senior judges with management responsibilities and the chief executive of the Judicial Offi ce.
A more varied range of accountability mechanisms is needed to respond to these redistributions and fragmentations of responsibility. Th is essay focuses on what happens (or does not happen) in Parliament, but it is instructive to note developments in accountability elsewhere. One is that as head of the judiciary of England and Wales, the LCJ holds an annual press conference, the transcript of which is published online. In December 2011, Joshua Rozenberg Lord Judge said he was 'very sympathetic with Mr Sumption and the views he has expressed', telling Steve Doughty of the Daily Mail that 'I would love to give you something to write down'. Lord Judge said 'Judges have to be careful to remember that we are enforcing the law. As to that, we have no choice. We enforce the law as we fi nd it to be. I think we have to be careful to remember that we cannot administer the responsibilities which others have'.
Since the 2010 coalition government came to power, new political priorities for accountability across the whole of government have been articulated. In a speech to civil servants, David Cameron MP outlined the Conservatives' approach:
We want to replace the old system of bureaucratic accountability with a new system of democratic accountability-accountability to the people, not the government machine. We want to turn government on its head, taking power away from Whitehall and putting it into the hands of people and communities. We want to give people the power to improve our country and public services, through transparency, local democratic control, competition and choice. 20 Courts boards provide an illustration of the new approach in relation to the judicial system. Th e Courts Act 2003, s 4 provided that 'England and Wales is to be divided into areas for each of which there is to be a courts board'. Boards had the duty 'to scrutinise, review and make recommendations about the way in which the Lord Chancellor is discharging his general duty in relation to the courts with which the board is concerned'.
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Boards consisted of at least one judge, two lay magistrates, and at least four others , two of whom were 'representative of the people living in the area'. Transparency has swept through the judicial system in recent years. Th e Ministry of Justice's business plan makes a commitment 'to ensure that the Department can be held to account as it moves this work forward and we will do this through our information strategy. Along with the rest of government, the Department will publish an unprecedented amount of data so the public can hold us to account. Th is will cover who we are, what we spend and what we achieve'.
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Th e Ministry now publishes, by court: what sentences are given for each type of off ence; conviction rates; how long it takes for cases to be decided; the number of sitting days; and fi nancial allocation and spend. 25 A similar commitment to transparency can be seen in the arm's length bodies, down to trivial expense claims.
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More signifi cantly, the whole judicial selection process is described in great detail on the Judicial Appointment Commission's website and in its publications.
B. Opportunities for parliamentary accountability
Against this background of dramatic increases in the judicial power of the state, changes in governance and new approaches to accountability, what role does Parliament have in oversight of the judicial system? What role should it have? Finding answers to these questions is not straightforward, not least because of the need to protect judicial independence from inappropriately targeted accountability claims.
Th e accountability toolkit
Parliament has at its disposal a variety of accountability mechanisms that can be deployed for oversight of the judicial system. Examples of how these are used are provided below :
i. Th ere are opportunities to scrutinize legislative proposals. In relation to bills, this now includes the possibility of pre-legislative scrutiny (if the government publishes a bill in draft), the legislative process in each House (with the parallel scrutiny of committees including the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the House of Lords Constitution Committee), and relatively new practices of post-legislative scrutiny (where the responsible government department reviews legislation fi ve years or so after enactment and reports to a Select Committee). ii. A variety of diff erent kinds of debate may be held on the fl oor of the House, including government motions, topical debates, substantive motions for the adjournment, and daily adjournment debates. iii. Ministers are obliged to answer oral and written questions. 'Th e purpose of a question is to obtain information or press for action; it should not be framed primarily so as to convey information, or so as to suggest its own answer or to convey a particular point of view, and it should not be in eff ect a short speech'. v. Select Committee inquires enable MPs and peers (usually working in a non-partisan, cross-party manner) to carry out detailed evidence-based investigations, receiving oral and written evidence. Reports may be debated on the fl oor of the House or in Westminster Hall. Th e relevant government department is expected to make a formal response to the committee's fi ndings and recommendations. vi. Pre-appointment Select Committee hearings for appointments to various senior public offi ces.
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In relation to the judicial system, the House of Commons Justice Committee is responsible for scrutinizing the government's preferred candidate for the chair of the Judicial Appointments Commission and the Chair of the Offi ce of Legal Complaints. Some commentators have argued in favour of extending pre-appointment scrutiny to senior judicial posts but so far Parliament has viewed this as anathema.
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Th ese may form a network of interconnected activities: for example, what a judge says in oral evidence to a Select Committee may be quoted in the committee's report, which in turn will prompt a debate in the House and a response from ministers; another illustration of the connectedness of the mechanisms is that information obtained by an MP from a written parliamentary question may be used to lobby a minister or in a speech on the fl oor of the House.
Select Committees
Select committees have acquired a central role in accountability practices relating to the judicial system. Th ey provide the most rigorous sort of parliamentary scrutiny, conducting thematic inquiries based on oral and written evidence. On occasion, the launch of an inquiry makes front-page news.
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Sometimes a Select Committee oral evidence session ends with the publication of a transcript on the relevant committee's web page. Normally, however, the Select Committee produces a report containing fi ndings and recommendations, often accompanied by a press release. Th e government is expected to make a formal written response within two months, which in turn is published by the Select Committee (with or without further comment). Subject to the pressures on the parliamentary time-table, a Select Committee will attempt to secure a debate on the fl oor of the House for a signifi cant inquiry. Th us, on 18 November 2008 the Constitution Committee's two reports on relations between the executive, judiciary and Parliament were the subject of a 'take note' debate in the 'dinner hour' during which ten speeches were made.
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Th ey are able to engage in follow-up inquiries if it is thought desirable to return to an issue. Th e practice of the Constitution Committee and the Justice Committee of having periodic meetings with the LCJ and the Lord Chancellor also enables some 'triangulation' to take place, whereby one is able to comment on the evidence previously given by the other.
One of the most notable developments in recent years is the phenomenon of judges appearing to give oral evidence to Select Committees and submitting written evidence. Judges are able to provide valuable technical advice to Parliament, which is particularly useful in an era of increasingly complex legislation. However, for appearances to be mutually benefi cial both the judiciary and Parliament need to be mindful of their respective roles-as Parliamentarians are aware, there are some areas of enquiry in which it is not appropriate for judges to become involved, for example in relation to political matters or issues relating to a particular case. Being drawn into such matters would be damaging for both future involvement in the work of committees and for the impartiality and reputation of the judiciary. For this reason, care is exercised by those involved when responding and in considering invitations to judges to appear before Parliament.
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Th ere appears, however, to be a feeling on the part of the judiciary and parliamentarians that meetings with Select Committees are generally valuable experiences for both sides. Over time, the judiciary has taken a more coordinated approach to requests to appear before committees. Th e Judicial Offi ce explains:
Should a Select Committee feel they require a judge to appear before them, the normal process is for the relevant Committee to contact the Lord Chief Justice's Offi ce seeking for an appropriate judge to be identifi ed, or to approach the judge directly. On some occasions judges are unable to attend Committee hearings due to sitting and other prior commitments. On other occasions it may be suggested to the Committee that judicial attendance would not be appropriate, as the issues to be discussed are 'political' in nature or might require adjudication at a later date. Th is has never caused diffi culties in the past; either the Committee accepts an alternative judge, or it would be inappropriate for a judge to give evidence. Neither the Lord Chief Justice, nor the Judicial Offi ce acting on his behalf, has ever prohibited attendance of a judge before a Select Committee. 37 In July 2008, the Judicial Executive Board issued 'Guidance for Judges appearing before or providing written evidence to parliamentary committees'.
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Th e document provides a list of types of questions which judges may not be willing to answer or in respect of which they will need to exercise caution: 'the merits of individual cases '; 'cases over which they have presided '; 'the merits or personalities of particular serving judges and politicians '; 'the merits of Government policy'; and bills or proposed legislation, 'save where the policy in question aff ects the administration of justice within his or her area of judicial responsibility '; the administration of justice which falls outside the judge's area of responsibility or previous responsibility ; and matters on which the government is consulting to which the judiciary will but has not yet responded. In fact, it is rare for a judge to be asked a 36 Th e practice in the House of Lords is for witnesses to be sent the proposed lines of questioning several days in advance of the hearing, though this does not happen routinely in the Commons. Th e extent to which members of a committee depart from the suggested lines of question varies, but for the most part the interview proceeds along the pre-prepared lines.
Judicial appearances before Select Committees have diff erent kinds of function. In some inquiries the judiciary is the focus of scrutiny. As the Constitution Committee states, Select Committees 'can play an important role in holding the judiciary to account by questioning the judges in public'. 40 Into this type fall the annual appearances of the LCJ. Where necessary, committees may be critical of the judiciary: thus, in 2007 the Constitution Committee gently suggested that the LCJ needed to re-appraise his media and public communications strategy and that the judges needed to make the Judicial Communications Offi ce 'more active and assertive in its dealing with the media in order to represent the judiciary eff ectively'.
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Later in the essay, two further examples of inquiries which included a focus on the judiciary are considered in which judges did not give evidence: the Joint Committee on Human Rights' inquiry into how the judiciary were interpreting s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (wrongly, the committee found); 42 and an inquiry by the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee which considered the judgments of Mr Justice Eady in relation to privacy (fi nding that the judge had not, contrary to the assertions of a newspaper editor, departed from precedent in cases on privacy rights).
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One possible reason for not hearing from judges in these inquiries is that any lines of questioning would have quickly taken the committees into forbidden territory-the merits of cases and the merits of particular serving judges.
A further function of judicial evidence is to comment on or criticize government policy or action in relation to the administration of justice or areas of public policy in which judges have particular experience or expertise. Th us, Sir Nicholas Wall (President of the Family Division of the High Court) was quoted in a committee's report on the government's proposed reform of legal aid as saying that the government 'is very ill-advised to concentrate on violence' rather than use the term 'domestic abuse'; and he said that the proposals created 'a perverse incentive' to take out injunctive proceedings against a former spouse. 44 His predecessor, Sir Mark Potter, described earlier proposals as 'a series of extremely crudely averaged 39 To declare an interest: the author has served as specialist adviser to the House of Commons Constitutional Aff airs Committee, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill, the House of Lords Constitution Committee, and the House of Commons Justice Committee in relation to judiciary-related matters. 40 fi xed fees', concluding that 'the whole thing has to be radically revised'.
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In relation to inquiries of this sort, Select Committee evidence is one way in which judges may make known to Parliament their misgivings about government proposals.
A third function of judicial evidence is educative: to explain to parliamentarians what the judges' role involves and what the limits of that role are. Examples include Baroness Hale's evidence to the JCHR on a British bill of rights (about adjudication on social and economic rights) 46 and Ryder J's evidence to the Justice Committee on the operation of family courts (on the diff erence that hearing the voice of the child could make).
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Th e Constitution Committee has suggested that there might be more of this kind of interaction, with judges 'encouraged to discuss their views on key legal issues in the cause of transparency and better understanding of such issues amongst both parliamentarians and the public'. 
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Th is is as true of inquiries in relation to the judicial system as it is in other contexts. It may be that the importance lies in the activity of engagement by parliamentarians with judges and others about the judicial system (rather than any specifi c 'wins' in infl uencing policy or practice). Select committee hearings now provide the only offi cial forum in which parliamentarians and judges may have a public conversation. Before the CRA 2005, the senior judiciary who were peers (the Law Lords and the Lord Chief Justice) were able to make contributions to debates on the fl oor of the House and, the conscientious objectors apart, 52 did so until disqualifi ed in the new constitutional arrangements.
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A sense of proportion is, however , needed: concern for judiciary-related matters is something of a niche interest among parliamentarians. Except perhaps where an MP's constituency is aff ected by court closures or reorganisation, the judicial system barely registers on 45 
C. Mapping accountability practices in Parliament
Th e previous section focused on the institutional mechanisms through which Parliament exercises accountability functions in relation to the judicial system. To develop a more nuanced and contextual understanding, attention now shifts to particular aspects of the judicial system. Five areas have been selected: (i) court judgments on points of law; (ii) the legislative and other texts that form the foundations of the judicial system; (iii) judicial appointments; (iv) judicial discipline; and (v) judicial leadership. An inductive approach is adopted to map out current accountability practices based on observation of the parliamentary record and to sketch out some basic principles that emerge from the realities of work in the Palace of Westminster. In several diff erent ways there is tension between what happens, what the 'rule book' indicates ought to happen (or not happen), and understandings of how basic constitutional principles such as the independence of the judiciary ought to operate.
Scrutiny of court judgments on points of law
Th e parliamentary rulebook discourages parliamentary scrutiny of the core judicial function of deciding cases and setting precedents. Erskine May states that questions to ministers 'seeking an expression of opinion on a question of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, or of an international document, a Minister's own powers, etc, are not in order since the courts rather than Ministers are competent in such matters'.
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Sub judice rules adopted by each House seek generally to prevent references being made to active court proceedings in any motion, debate or question (subject to the discretion of the Speaker or committee chair). 55 Moreover, questions 'which refl ect on the decision of a court of law' are not in order. 56 As already noted, the Judicial Executive Board guidance to members of the judiciary appearing before Select Committees urges judges to avoid answering questions which deal with the 'merits of individual cases'. In between these obstacles, there is, however , scope for parliamentary scrutiny of judgments. Th e second report was made while an appeal on the relevant point of law was pending before the House of Lords, preventing the committee from commenting on the particular case.
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Both reports drew on written evidence from a variety of public bodies and interest groups. Th e reports led to an unsuccessful private member's bill seeking to reverse the precedent set by a series of judgments, including House of Lords authority; a change of law was brought about by s 145 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, resulting in care homes being subject to the Convention rights.
Th e methodical work of the JCHR in reviewing case law and bringing together a body of evidence about the impact of the approach taken by the courts to interpreting the HRA 1998 should not be regarded as undermining judicial independence, so long as parliamentarians are clear that their views expressed in reports and debates are opinions expressed in a political arena. In the UK, it is safe to assume that the courts will exclude politicians' views as generally irrelevant to their adjudicatory task. Th is can be seen in the leading case of YL v Birmingham City Council in which the Law Lords had to consider the same issue canvassed by the JCHR. Lord Mance, noting the existence of the two reports, said 'such statements must be left to one side' and 'So far as these reports proceed on the basis that Parliament had any particular intention, that is the issue which the [Appellate Committee of the] House has to determine according to the relevant principles of statutory construction'.
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Reference was also made to the written evidence to the JCHR from Age Concern England. In carrying out post-legislative scrutiny 63 of the Act in 2012, the Ministry of Justice told the Justice Select Committee it had not carried out any detailed examination to assess the impact of s 1. To do so would, the Ministry said, be 'impractical in resource terms' but also would not be appropriate 58 'as it could be seen as undermining the independence of the judiciary and casting doubt on the way in which they have interpreted the law'.
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Clearly there is a diff erence between the Ministry's and the JCHR's understanding of the constitutional propriety of a body other than the courts discussing the case law fl owing from relatively recent legislation. Th e judiciary did not seem to share the Ministry's concerns when the idea of post-legislative scrutiny was fi rst being worked out in recommendations of the House of Lords Constitution Committee and the Law Commission.
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Th e Law Commission heard from the Association of District Judges that the 'most important considerations for review were likely to be "diffi culties in interpretation and unintended legal consequences" '.
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Th e Judges' Council envisaged that 'individual judges might send any comments they have made about legislation in judgments to the body undertaking the scrutiny work and that judges should be made aware of this possibility but not obliged to follow this route'. In June, the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Nick Herbert MP) made a statement saying 'Th ere seems to be general agreement that this was an unusual judgment, which overturned 25 years of legal understanding. We cannot wait for a Supreme Court decision, and emergency legislation is therefore sensible and appropriate'. Responding to a question ('Does my right hon. Friend agree that judgments such as this, which fl y in the face of common sense, run the risk of bringing our justice system into disrepute?'), the minister said: 'I think that the best way that I could respond would be by quoting the legal expert Professor Michael Zander QC, whom my hon. Friend may have heard on the "Today" programme this morning. He said: "Th e only justifi cation for the ruling is a literal interpretation of the Act which makes no sense" '.
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Th e House of Lords Constitution Committee criticized the Government's decision to introduce a bill while an appeal to the Supreme Court was pending; this gave rise to 'diffi cult issues of constitutional principle as regards both the separation of powers and the rule of law' (a point that government appeared not to accept). Th e fast-tracked bill, which had retrospective eff ect, became the Police (Detention and Bail) Act 2011 and the Greater Manchester Police withdrew their appeal.
Th e parliamentary response to the PACE ruling highlights the question of timing: the general rules of sub judice discourage Parliament from scrutinizing judgments or commenting on cases which are actually pending before the courts while retaining the ultimate right to legislate on any matter.
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Comity and practical coordination between the judicial, legislative and executive limbs of the state require a principled approach to be taken in relation to cases that are awaiting decision on appeal to the Supreme Court; it is far from clear that this happened. Example 1.4. Th e House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, carrying out an inquiry into press freedom and privacy, reported under the heading 'Mr Justice Eady and Privacy Law' that they had 'received no evidence in this inquiry that the judgments of Mr Justice Eady in the area of privacy have departed from following the principles set out by the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights', adding that 'If he, or indeed any other High Court judge, departed from these principles, we would expect the matter to be successfully appealed to a higher court '. 73 In reaching that conclusion, the committee heard from journalists, judges and lawyers. Th e review into the jurisprudence and ideology of Mr Justice Eady is probably best seen as turning on the specifi c circumstances of a particular Select Committee inquiry: the committee was faced with allegations made by an editor of a national newspaper and they felt could not, in the context, be ignored. Th e committee's report was carefully worded and favourable in outcome to the judge. Th ere is, however, a signifi cant threat that individual judicial independence is compromised if a Select Committee embarks on a line of inquiry into a body of case law by a named judge.
Foundations
In the absence of a written constitution, the constitutional framework of the judicial system has to rest on ordinary legislation (primary and secondary), 'soft law' and constitutional conventions. and the list of 'qualities and attributes' required for judicial offi ce-in other words, how 'merit' is defi ned-published by the JAC.
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Th e following two examples provide contrasting approaches to policy formation and legislative scrutiny : Example 2.1. In 2003, the government made a surprise announcement of plans to abolish the offi ce of Lord Chancellor, create a Supreme Court in place of the Law Lords, and establish a new system for judicial appointments in England and Wales. Th ere had been no consultation with the senior judiciary. Th e proposals were subject to protracted parliamentary debate and scrutiny before the bill was published: in an unusual move, the Conservative Opposition in the House of Lords successfully moved an amendment to the Loyal Address after the Queen's Speech (calling on the government 'to withdraw their current proposals and to undertake meaningful consultation with Parliament and the senior judiciary before proceeding with legislation'); a major inquiry and report by the House of Commons Constitutional Aff airs Committee; and a 'take note' debate in the Lords.
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Th e House of Commons Constitutional Aff airs Committee criticized the Government for not publishing a draft bill. 79 At second reading of the Constitutional Reform Bill in March 2004, the Lords voted to refer the bill to a special committee with powers to take evidence and amend the bill before recommitting it to a Committee of the Whole House (a procedure that had lain dormant for several decades). Several members of the judiciary took part in Lords debates and one voted in a division (Lord Hoff mann, against the government). 'Carried over' to the 2004-5 session, the bill was modifi ed in signifi cant ways in both Houses before receiving Royal Assent fi ve days before Parliament was prorogued for the 2005 general election.
Example 2.2. In 2000, the government appointed an independent panel, chaired by retired judge Sir Andrew Leggatt, with broad terms of reference to undertake a review of 'the delivery of justice through tribunals other than ordinary courts of law' leading to a report in 2001. 
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In 2006, the Government published a draft Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill.
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Neither the House of Commons Justice Committee nor the House of Lords Constitution Committee felt able to fi nd time to carry out pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft bill. As well as completely re-designing the tribunal system (or 'maze' as critics dubbed it), the bill would amend the eligibility criteria for all judicial appointments. Th e House of Lords Constitution Committee successfully called for a provision on ADR included in the draft bill but removed from the bill 'proper' to be reinstated.
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Th e legislation in these two examples was of great practical and constitutional importance. In the fi rst, 'back of the envelope' policy-making and a government decision not to publish a draft bill was countered by careful (albeit often partisan) parliamentary scrutiny that left few clauses unturned. In the second, careful policy making with judicial involvement, a White Paper and a draft bill were met with relative indiff erence by parliamentary Select Committees. Example 2.3. In January 2004, the Lord Chancellor (Lord Falconer) and the LCJ (Lord Woolf ) announced that agreement had been reached on the principles and practices governing the transfer of functions from the former to the latter under the government's proposals. Th is came to be known as 'the concordat'. In their 2007 report, the House of Lords Constitution Committee stated that, although many aspects of the concordat had been put on a statutory footing by the CRA 2005 , 'it is clear to us that the concordat continues to be of great constitutional importance'.
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In a debate on the Constitution Committee's report, Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (President of the Council, speaking for the government) said 'Th e Government will consult and work with the judiciary to ensure that the concordat remains live and relevant, and that changes to both the framework document and the concordat are properly put before this House'. Th e House of Lords Constitution Committee, which was midway through an inquiry on relations between government, judges and Parliament, also considered the handling of the creation of the new ministry.
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Th ese two examples demonstrate the importance of non-statutory foundations for the judicial system. In relation to the concordat, there are several statements about its perceived importance , but parliamentarians have not been specifi c about what exactly their continuing role might appropriately be in scrutiny of the future developments of the concordat. Th is uncertainty is a refl ection of doubts about the constitutional status of the concordat. On one view, its importance has faded since most of its provisions have been put on a statutory footing by the CRA 2005 and the conventions and institutional arrangements that have subsequently developed. Example 2.4 shows the mediating role Parliament is able to play when fundamental disagreements arise between government and the judiciary. A carefully planned campaign by senior judges allowed them to use Select Committee hearings to vent their concerns about the manner in which the government had acted in setting up the MoJ as well as the substance of the government's plans. and in 2010, hearing from Baroness Prashar (the chair), Jonathan Sumption QC (as he then was), and Edward Nally (legal practitioner members).
Judicial appointments
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Th e picture that emerges is of some parliamentarians in both Houses keen to have oversight of the judicial appointments system as a whole, and to exercise scrutiny on a regular and rigorous basis. So far, however, parliamentarians have consistently rejected suggestions that they should have any role in individual senior appointments, as House of Commons Select Committees now have in relation to several public offi ces for which they carry out pre-appointment hearings with the preferred candidate.
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One of the main reasons for eschewing this direct form of accountability is that parliamentary involvement would risk undermining judicial independence, in fact or perception, if appointment hearings were to be conducted along partisan lines. Th is is a concern that needs to be taken seriously, though in an era when the LCJ subjects himself to an annual press conference and judges are content to give public lectures openly critical of government , the concern may be overstated. 
Judicial discipline
Th e British constitution allocates to Parliament alone the power to dismiss judges of the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court: judges hold offi ce 'during good behaviour, subject to a power of removal by Her Majesty on an address presented to Her by both Houses of Parliament'. 98 No judge has been subject to this procedure in modern times, but it is important to recognise that Parliament has this ultimate 'sacrifi cial' tool of accountability. Dismissal of judges below the level of the High Court on grounds of misbehaviour is by the Lord Chancellor with the concordance of the LCJ. Erskine May is clear that 'Unless the discussion is based upon a substantive motion, refl ections must not be cast upon the conduct of . . . judges of the superior courts of the United Kingdom, including persons holding the position of a judge, such as circuit judges and their deputies, as well as recorders'. 
100
It seems that the judge had, in fact, already tendered his resignation. Example 4.2. Mark Todd MP led a debate on 'Judicial Error (Compensation)' in Westminster Hall. He dealt in detail with the case of a constituent who had been convicted of indecent assault, which was subsequently held to be unsafe by the Court of Appeal. Th e MP was critical of the trial judge (whom he did not name) and went on to say :
Th e straight answer is that I do not know what happened to the judge after his decision was corrected. Although I can appreciate that the objectivity and independence of the judiciary might be harmed by, say, the ability of a complainant to sue the judge for damages where their error causes harm, I would expect some accountability to be exercised for judicial error. On my observation, we instead enter into a polite and largely private world. Some of the texts that I have read, which were written by learned lawyers, point out that it can be argued that the appellate process off ers some accountability, in that it demonstrates where a correction is required of a judge.
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For the government, Harriett Harman MP accepted that this individual case 'raises a number of important and diffi cult points of principle' and went on to explain the compensation schemes available for wrongful convictions (which did not apply) and the new Offi ce of Judicial Conduct. Example 4.3. An MP used the daily adjournment debate to raise the 'somewhat esoteric subject of ex parte applications in the family courts' and a specifi c case involving constituents. It appears that there has never been Select Committee scrutiny of the report or any debate of it in Parliament.
It is diffi cult to see how individualized censure can ever be appropriate in the light of (a) the principle of independence of the judiciary and (b) the existence of the Offi ce for Judicial Complaints, established as part of the new CRA arrangements. Parliament's attention would be better directed at ensuring eff ective systematic scrutiny of the general work of the OJC, but this it has failed to do despite the availability of a detailed annual report.
Judicial governance
Th e fi nal aspects of the judicial system that will be examined are the new institutions of self-governance, with the LCJ at its apex. As noted above, there has been a transfer of management and leadership power to the judiciary under the CRA 2005.
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Th e making of annual reports is an accountability tool in its own right but is also capable of being the basis of further parliamentary scrutiny. Example 5.1. Th e LCJ has no statutory duty to make an annual report. In May 2006, Lord Phillips CJ told the House of Lords Constitution Committee that this 'is something we are considering'. In July 2007, he announced that the Judicial Executive Board would publish an annual report. 105 Th e House of Lords Constitution Committee welcomed this, as 'the report will provide a useful opportunity for both Houses of Parliament to debate these matters on an annual basis, and for the Lord Chief Justice to engage eff ectively with parliamentarians and the public'. 106 Th e Lord Chancellor told Parliament that 'Th e Lord Chief Justice views this as a way to demonstrate the judiciary's accountability to the public and parliamentarians without compromising judicial independence'. 107 Th ere then followed uncertainty about the procedural mechanism whereby such a report could be made to Parliament. CRA 2005 , s 5 provides that the LCJ 'may lay before Parliament written representations on matters that appear to him to be matters of importance relating to the judiciary, or otherwise to the administration of justice'. Initially, this had been seen as a 'nuclear option', to be used only in circumstances approaching a constitutional crisis. Th ese have not been debated in Parliament. Th e judiciary website states : 'Future reviews will be produced to provide information about the preceding Legal Year'.
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Example 5.2. In February 2010, the Senior President of Tribunals presented his fi rst annual report. Th e foreword explained that it was 'not intended as a formal report under section 43 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007' under which the Senior President 'is required to report annually to the Lord Chancellor, specifi cally about "cases " rather than the function of the new system of tribunals in general'. 113 Th e report is succinct but informative. It deals with organisational matters and with tribunal law and jurisprudence. It includes contributions from diff erent tribunal judges. A second annual report appeared in February 2011. Th ere was no discussion of either report on the parliamentary record.
Th ese two examples reveal uncertainty about the scope and purpose of the reporting duties contained in legislation.Th e examples also show varying degrees of eagerness by Select Committees to follow-up annual reports with evidence sessions.
D. Conclusions
It has been argued that the orthodox approach to parliamentary accountability practices in relation to the judicial system-a prohibited zone plus ministerial responsibility-is no longer viable given the dramatic changes that have taken place in the judicial power of the state, the governance of the judiciary, and rising expectations about the degrees to which all public bodies are held to account. Additional tools of accountability are needed. Th is study has sought to examine the ways in which MPs and peers have and use opportunities to exercise an accountability role: all the accountability procedures at their disposal are used to some extent. Select committees appear to be regarded as especially important, both for parliamentarians and the judiciary.
Although constitutional principle and standing orders discourage parliamentary scrutiny of the core activities of the judicial system (deciding individual cases and setting precedents), parliamentarians can and do inquire into case law and approaches to statutory interpretation, though there are unresolved questions about the constitutional propriety of doing so, for example in carrying out post-legislative scrutiny. Parliament's record in examining legislative change is mixed: the CRA 2005 shows Parliament responding in a thorough if rather partisan way to poorly prepared government policy; the failure of any Select Committee to undertake pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill demonstrates the diffi culties parliamentarians have in fi nding time and enthusiasm for eff ective legislative scrutiny. Th ere seems no appetite among MPs or peers for involvement in individual judicial appointments. From time to time, MPs seek to criticize individual judges for their conduct but there has been little or no interest in scrutinizing the work of the complaints system that now exists. In relation to judicial leadership and governance, there is a lack of clarity about when and why statutory duties to make annual reports should exist and variations in practice in making and scrutinizing reports.
Eff ective parliamentary accountability mechanisms, respecting the independence of the judiciary, are important for the legitimacy of the judicial system. Th ey may also help to dissuade ministers and their speechwriters from taking cheap shots at judges and judgments. 
